

## Round Table

# THE TRANSITION FROM UNIPOLARITY TO REAL MULTIPOLARITY: THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW GEOPOLITICS

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### CHAIRPERSONS:

- S. Yu. GLAZYEV *Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*
- P. N. GUSEV *Editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Moskovsky Komsomolets,” Chairman of the Commission of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation for the Support of Mass Media, Chairman of the Union of Journalists of Moscow*
- S. I. KISLYAK *First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on International Affairs (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the USA (2008–2017)*
- K. F. ZATULIN *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries*

### SPEAKERS:

- I. O. ABRAMOVA *Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*
- D. O. BABICH *Journalist and columnist for the RIA Novosti news agency (Moscow)*
- I. I. BUZOVSKY *Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Belarus (Minsk), Candidate of Sociological Sciences*
- V. A. CHERESHNEV *Chief Researcher of the Institute of Immunology and Physiology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Ekaterinburg), member of the Presidium of the Ural Branch of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Medicine), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS*
- E. G. DRAPEKO *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Honored Artist of the Russian Federation*
- L. L. FITUNI *Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Head of the Center for Global and Strategic Studies of the Institute, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*
- Al. A. GROMYKO *Director of the Institute of Europe of the RAS (Moscow), corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Professor of the RAS*
- A. KEVIN *Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University (Canberra), diplomat (1968–1998), independent expert, recipient of literary prizes*
- Ye. V. KHARITONOVA *Senior Researcher at the Institute of Africa of the RAS (Moscow), Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Associate Professor*
- V. V. NAUMKIN *Scientific supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor*
- V. N. PUNCHENKO *Deputy Director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (Minsk)*
- V. A. SHAMAKHOV *Scientific supervisor of the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (St. Petersburg), Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, 1st class State Councillor of the Russian Federation, Colonel General of the Customs Service*

- S. A. TSYPLYAEV *Editor-in-Chief of the national scientific-political journal "Vlast" (Moscow), Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, 3rd class State Councillor of the Russian Federation, Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy*
- M. V. ZAKHAROVA *Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*
- A. S. ZAPESOTSKY *President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation*

**A. S. ZAPESOTSKY:** – Dear friends, the theme of the section is outlined, it continues to pursue the subject we have discussed yesterday, so please, as you speak, give feedback to your colleagues who spoke on the previous day of the Conference. Then we will have an actual discussion and not a series of monologues. Thank you. The section is moderated by Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev and Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulín.

**S. Yu. GLAZYEV:** – I will start with an introduction to outline the features of the transition to real multipolarity.

The transition to multipolarity and an integrated world economic order involves restoration of national sovereignty, since it is the basis for international law. The defunct imperial world order was characterized by the presence of two nuclei – the USSR and the United States. Each of these centers of power sought to rebuild the world in its own image. In the countries under its influence, the Soviet Union established its customary structures of governance, while the U.S. tried to impose the use of the dollar on the world and created the most favorable conditions for the work of its transnational corporations.

The fundamental difference between the integral way of life and the imperial way of life is that the former will not have a center imposing the rules of the game on the rest. Of course, there will be a nucleus: as I said earlier, the competition will mainly be concentrated between India and China, at least in the economy, because today these countries produce more products than the leaders of the previous world order.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by a period of liberal globalization, but now the main focus of international cooperation is a combination of competitive advantages and the creation of conditions for joint investment, production and infrastructure projects. Again, the countries of the new world economy do not seek to establish universal rules of the game for all actors. Yes, there is the World Trade Organization, the World Monetary Fund, conventions that need to be respected, but there is no pressure on other players to act in exactly the same way, such as liberalizing currency regulations. A variety of systems of economic regulation, including currency restrictions, becomes acceptable. At the same time, regional associations are being formed. Clearly, the countries differ in scale, and relatively small states tend to create regional economic associations, within which barriers are erased and common norms of regulation begin to work. The variety of these associations is very broad: from rather amorphous structures like MERCOSUR to a bureaucratic empire, as I call the European Union.

The EU, which is characterized by a very rigid system of governance, is somewhat of an offspring of the previous imperial world economic order. In contrast to this association, the Eurasian Economic Union is flexible: it is responsible only for regulating common markets and decisions are taken by consensus, where each state can block a proposal that it does not like.

Today Nur-Sultan hosts a regular meeting of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). Being the Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the EEC, I can say that over the past 10 years we have made over 5,000 decisions, and consensus has been found on all of them. This means that in the Eurasian Economic Union, the commonality of interests dominates over country differences. We form many areas of international economic cooperation: sign memorandums, form preferential trade zones, and establish large-scale trade and economic relations with China. A network of international relations created in this way takes into account the characteristics of partner countries.

Perhaps the most large-scale interaction of the Eurasian Economic Union is unfolding as part of the conjunction with China's One Belt One Road initiative, and it is an example of cooperation in a new world economic order: it adheres to the principles of mutual benefit and respect for partners' sovereignty, its efforts are focused on joint investments, and none of the partners imposes their conditions on the others. This is the only way that our economies together create new, better and more efficient goods and services, for the living standards of our countries to rise.

International law in the new world economic order will obviously be more extensive. In particular, the EEC promotes the idea of signing an international treaty establishing a new monetary and financial system. No country should be able to privatize the world's currency, because all economic relations in the new world order should be based on mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. Accordingly, it is proposed to create a new world currency. It is based on two components: a basket of national currencies and a basket of exchange-traded commodities. With such a model, the currency will be stable and efficient in terms of pricing and the formation of a transparent system of payments and settlements, where no one can introduce sanctions, impose their interests and extract seigniorage due to the monopoly on the issue of world currency.

Of course, the fundamentals of international trade law will be preserved. In addition, I consider cybersecurity to be a very important legal issue today. Clearly, an international convention on cybersecurity must be concluded to ensure that no state engages in cyberterrorism. Perhaps coun-

tries that have ratified the convention should impose embargoes on the use of information technologies and networks of those states that have not signed the convention. Currently, the U.S. opposes such an initiative and it is clear why: they are the leaders of cyberterrorism. It is also necessary to achieve conclusion of a biosafety convention and create measures that would force states, especially the U.S., to comply with the norms of this convention. This will prevent the emergence of a global electronic concentration camp under the auspices of the World Health Organization or other structures.

To quit the hybrid war, an international coalition is needed. I think that in building such a coalition, one can start from Asia. We are working on the implementation of the Russian president's idea of forming a Greater Eurasian Partnership, which could become the prototype of a new world economic order. It embodies the principle of integration of integrations, since it involves not only the Eurasian Economic Union, but also the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN-China regional partnership.

Thus, the creation of mutually beneficial economic relations based on a reliable legal framework is the most important task that must be solved to quit the global hybrid war. The aggressor must understand that it can be irreparably damaged. Abandoning the use of dollar and euro would entail this damage – it would destroy the gigantic currency and financial pyramids that now loom over the world economy.

Of course, it is very difficult to reconcile the interests of the players on the world stage. However, Russia today is in the state of the country most interested in initiating these kinds of large-scale proposals to reform the international economic and political system. I invite the section participants to discuss this and other questions. I give the floor to Konstantin Fedorovich.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Dear colleagues, Now we know where to start the discussion, but we don't know who to start with yet. Are there any volunteers?

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – It would be my pleasure.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova has the floor.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – Speaking recently at the World Economic Forum in Davos, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said (direct quote): “When we realize that our world is becoming multipolar, it should push us toward even more multilateralism, even more international cooperation.” In a multipolar world, very different international partners want more political influence pro rata to their growing global influence. But if you believe that this idea is a discovery of the Western Europe, you will be disappointed. In fact, the same thing has been discussed in Russia for about twenty years. In my Telegram channel I published a selection of quotes from the country's leadership about multipolarity. One of the earliest theses in it belongs to Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov. His ideologeme was reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia of 2000 and has since become one of the key principles of our country's international relations. And suddenly, 22 years

later, Olaf Scholz announces that we are living in a new multipolar world.

What does that tell you? First, that they did not hear us to the west of Moscow, did not take our words seriously. However, the idea of multipolarity was being explored, not because of quotations from Russian politicians or their concepts, but simply because of the objective reality of the emergence of new centers of influence. Despite all this, the U.S. and its allies still consider themselves the masters of destiny and continue to harbor the illusion of a unipolar world order model with a single decision-making center in Washington. Their task is clear – to prevent the loss of their own hegemony at all costs, even if only in words, because this is also important. We understand that shaping up the reality can begin in virtual domain. Recall the telling words of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, uttered shortly before the end of Barack Obama's presidency, at the UN Security Council meeting on Syria. The participants' assessments of events differed so much that Kerry exclaimed: “I don't know whether I'm in a real or virtual dimension!” Of course, these dimensions influence each other.

Of course, in order to maintain this virtual unipolarity and impose it in the format of Realpolitik, the West uses a wide range of tools, from sanctions of all kinds to direct coercive pressure. In general, the sanctions that are now being imposed on Russia can be considered a direct coercive pressure, because their purpose is to break the back of the state. It is a hybrid, but fundamentally a forceful method of struggle. We are not talking about pinpoint methods, not “red flags,” but weapons, tools that can inflict lethal damage on the state. The main question is whether the state has ways of resisting such tools.

The strategy of imposing hegemony and monopolizing all spheres by the leader has led the world to millions of civilian casualties. And I'm only referring to the last thirty years.

Why has the West now begun to incorporate the word “multipolarity,” even though it is clear that confidence of Western countries in their own exceptionalism denies the very essence of this concept? As I said, the concept of multipolarity is being worked on. The West will never recognize a real multipolarity – it will create its own. It has already begun to do so. By the way, I know that many people don't like the term “multipolarity” because technically there are only two poles. In my opinion, this metaphor has the right to exist. Besides, if Joe Biden is to be believed, there are more than two hemispheres on Earth.

Of course, the United States sees itself as the main pole of Western multipolarity. The place of the natural companion of the main pole is given to the European Union. The other poles will be shaped by the leaders without recognizing any of the existing candidates for this role – the SCO, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), African states, etc.

In my opinion, the Quad Alliance concept is one of the clearest examples of how a new reality is taking shape. There is a stable concept of the Asia-Pacific region, which requires no further justification or explanation. It is used by everyone, geographers, politicians and journalists alike. To promote the idea of new poles, the West abandons the term APR and introduces the concept of “Indo-Pacific region.” This is an apparent distortion of the existing perception and planting of a new one, replacing the natural pole

with an artificial one. The same can be said of the U.S.-initiated “Summit for Democracy,” where invited countries were divided into liberal democracies, weaker democracies and states with characteristics of authoritarianism.

I would like to conclude by outlining two crises. The first is the crisis of liberalism. Liberalism, of course, has completely departed from the true and deep concepts that originally constituted its idea, and one can now speak of a dictatorship of liberalism or a liberal dictatorship, totalitarian liberalism, etc.

The second crisis is the crisis of law. The system of international organizations does not fulfill its functions; the principles prescribed in the fundamental conventions are not applied in practice. Can we, the people in this room, freely operate the legal machinery? We have not a slightest idea of how many legal rules directly affecting our lives appear on a daily basis. And people gathered here can not only read, but also analyze. All of this suggests that the law has approached a crisis, or perhaps a stalemate of development. Hence, there are many related problems.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Now I would like to give the floor to representatives of the West, although in this case geographically it is the representative of the South. I greet Mr. Anthony Kevin, honorary member of the Australian National University.

**A. KEVIN:** – Thank you for inviting me to speak. I had come a long way from Australia, flying 24 hours, as did my Swiss colleague Guy Mettan. He and I are the only Westerners to attend this conference.

The aspect of multipolarity to which I would like to devote my remarks is the situation in light of the special military operation in Ukraine. Of course, as noted yesterday, the operation was a major turning point in international relations, and the world will never be the same as it has been for the past 25 years. I do hope that one day there will be the multipolarity that my colleagues talked about yesterday.

Two days ago I met with Mr. Grigoryev, chairman of St. Petersburg Committee on Foreign Relations. It was a great honor. We had an excellent, very wide-ranging conversation, and I said that East and West are in a state of disconnect. As they say, we broke up. I think the Russian word “razvod” (“divorce”) describes the situation very accurately. As a result, the influence of the West is weakening and the influence of the rest of the world is increasing, and Russia plays a very important role in this process.

The title of my work “Towards Novorus” speaks for itself, and I strongly advise my colleagues to read it. Now I’d like to add a few words on my personal journey. I was Australia’s ambassador to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Cambodia. By all standards and traditions, I should have been a respected elderly statesman in my country. Except I’m not: I don’t have the right to vote in Australia. Everything I write goes in the desk. I am not invited to meetings of the Australian Broadcasting corporation. I am not invited to discuss. I was safely cancelled. I wish I could pass greetings to you from my country and my government, but I can only say hello from your magnificent Ambassador Alexei Pavlovsky and from your wonderful TASS correspondent Anna Arkaeva.

An avalanche of false information about the special operation in Ukraine has hit the Russian community in Aus-

tralia. The situation within this community is very tense right now. It is a tragedy. I can say with all confidence that I have studied the war with the help of various sources – all open sources on both sides – and as an experienced diplomat with a strong background, I declare that the operation is necessary. I believe that it exacerbates the trends that have threatened Russia since 1991 and demonstrates with incredible clarity that Russia’s very existence has been put at risk. I am an Australian patriot, and I have always believed in the importance and necessity of a policy of detente, of the normalization of relations between the East and the West. It’s unlikely to be possible now – certainly not in my lifetime.

When I came to your country this time, I could not change money into Russian money. I was reimbursed for my airfare in rubles, which gives me a very pleasant vacation here. It starts tomorrow. I couldn’t get an insurance, so I bought it here from Ingosstrakh. I could not find a safe way to bring 120 thousand rubles across the border, but I obtained a debit card from Sberbank. In fact, if I got paid a salary for what I write, I might as well live here now, because I have insurance and ID. Here, if you will, is a small example of how the world is being divided.

I think I’ll finish here. Thank you for your generosity. Russia must remain strong in this time of trial. Yesterday we witnessed free expression of diverse, contradictory ideas, and I would like to pay special tribute to Maria Zakharova for attending this event. Such a discussion would not be possible in Australia in these times.

Unfortunately, we are a very small and humble member of the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, but there are other voices in Australia. We are not many, but we exist. With this, I conclude my presentation.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Mr. Kevin, we welcome you as a prisoner of conscience.

Now I would like to give the floor to Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of our country to the United States from 2008 to 2017, and current Senator of the Russian Federation from the Republic of Mordovia.

**S. I. KISLYAK:** – First of all I would like to thank the organizers of the event, because we really need to think seriously about what we mean by real multipolarity or polycentricity. The term has become so commonplace that people, as always happens in such cases, no longer wonder what is behind it or how to achieve it. And it’s really not easy to achieve.

I am ready to subscribe to every point made by Sergey Yuryevich. The problem is how to achieve polycentricity (I like that term better than “multipolarity”), because we live in a world where resistance to the goal we are now discussing will be very tough. Besides, we must not forget that our opponents still have a lot of strength.

Speaking of our main opponent, the Americans, I would like to point out a peculiarity of their thinking that is especially evident under the current presidential administration. These people came to power based on the argument that the U.S. has an obligation to ensure its leadership in all spheres of life in the world. The word “leadership” in the American (not English, but American) is understood as “natural management.” The explanation is also formulated in the purely American way: if the Americans do not ensure their lead-

ership, someone else will become the leader. That is, the very idea of polycentricity as we understand it – a consensus concert of states – does not exist in American political thinking. Thus, Americans believe that if they do not define the rules of behavior of the world community, then someone else will do it, which they strongly dislike.

Of course, they are well aware that there is an objective reality and polycentricity matures regardless of what they say about it. So, again, Biden administration officials are making a particularly notable effort to promote American leadership. Their logic is as follows: if other centers of influence emerge, it is necessary to take control of this process and put the right people at the head of the potential centers. In doing this, they use support of allies that are selected in each region based on the situation there. Of course, they also need an adversary against whom all actors are united. In the end, strictly speaking, polycentricity as a concept of the future world order is not rejected by the United States, but their understanding of polycentricity has nothing in common with ours.

The events in Ukraine, which have essentially been imposed on us, and what is happening around them is a prime example of how the U.S. will use objectively existing problems in the world to build polycentricity under its own leadership.

Returning to the ideas of Sergey Yuryevich (I emphasize again: each of them is in our interests), I wonder how to implement them. The question arises: who can be our most powerful partner in creating the new world? The objective reality is that now we are closest to the European Union. Time will tell how close we are, but I personally have no doubts that the EU is closer to Russia than the others. However, Russia also needs allies who can seriously influence the formation of the world system. Today, China and India are the most prominent of these countries.

As for China, the immediate question is, does it need the change? The U.S. (and the Chinese themselves admit it) does not deny that China has grown into the current economic superpower within the rules of the liberal economic construct, which was created and managed by the Americans. To the dislike of our Western partners, China, being inside their system and relying on market mechanisms that they created for themselves, has become their most powerful competitor, capable of eventually taking control of the world markets as well. This is one of Americans' most troubling prospects in terms of development of the world economy. Will the people of China, whose national thinking spans centuries, be ready to change the system quickly with us under the current conditions? Based on our own character, the needs of the domestic economy, and the political situation in the world, we are interested in a rapid change. Otherwise, we just won't feel the effects of them. The Chinese, however, are unlikely to give up easily upon a system that they have managed to adapt to and where they already feel comfortable.

Here is a small but illustrative example. It has been reported that Huawei will not supply communications equipment to the Russian Federation. Obviously, the Americans pressured the Chinese, or maybe not in this particular case, because the overall history of pressure on Huawei by the Americans is so long that the Chinese themselves could have calculated the consequences. What has happened suggests that China will not seek new ways of economic inter-

action with Russia, but will continue to proceed on the basis of what opportunities it still has in the system where it has succeeded.

What kind of an ally can India become in the economic and political context is also a topic for serious analysis. India is a very interesting country, it has its own view of the world. Its population is growing very rapidly, and even only because of this, India has every chance of becoming one of the most influential economic powers along with China in the near future. Yesterday I quoted the International Monetary Fund's forecast that the Indian economy will outpace the American economy by 10–15% by mid-century. In my view, the Indians will not be able to partner with Russia to the extent that it needs to build a unified polycentric system based on principles that are fair and reasonable, from its point of view.

Last but not least, I would like to focus on international law. It is under serious pressure – I fully support Maria Vladimirovna's opinion. We should be extremely aware that the world has become unusually cynical. Many countries abide by the principle that law is a tool to protect the weak, and they need it more than the strong, so the latter do not necessarily need to develop and strengthen the law, or adhere to its norms. This principle is increasingly reinforced in the mentality of Americans, and indeed of all Anglo-Saxons and at least half of Europeans in general. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (and all of us as much as we can) is publicly trying to fight the concept imposed on us that the world must act on the basis of rules rather than law. This, of course, it is not simply a matter of choice of words: rules can include the law without being limited to it. In the view of Western countries, the rules should be shaped by the one who is able to do so, that is, the strong one. Until today, they were that strong player. And so the rules extend much further than international law, to which the weak are believed to be clinging.

Consequently, a return to the understanding that international law must be seen as the dominant instrument in the construction of any polycentric schemes must remain one of the central elements of our foreign policy, in whatever dimensions we pursue it – in cooperation with the EU that is close to us or in the struggle at international arenas.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – I give the floor to Alexei Anatolyevich Gromyko, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

**AI. A. GROMYKO:** – In the lives of politicians, diplomats, and big business, there are at least two tyrants – time and the underlying currents of history. Often we mistake a lurch of history for fundamental shifts. There are events that should be measured not by months or even years, but by decades.

Let's try to imagine the year 2050. Who, in a little less than thirty years, will be among the top ten countries in the world in terms of GDP, taking into account the purchasing power parity? At the end of 2021, Russia was in sixth place by this indicator. I would guess that in 2050, the top five will very likely be centers of power such as China, the United States, Japan, India, and possibly Germany. Brazil, South Korea, Turkey, Mexico, and Indonesia will seriously compete with Russia for a position in the top ten. Mind that by 2050, out of the European countries (and they under-

stand it quite well in Europe), only Germany will be able to claim a place in the top ten largest economies in the world. There probably won't be Britain or France, let alone smaller countries. For Russia, such a development would be a challenge. And its position will depend not on the actions of other countries, but on the internal situation, primarily in the socio-economic sphere.

Next I would like to say this. Recently, especially during the pandemic, we have heard a lot of speculations about whether things that are now happening in the world are actually a new thing. Perhaps it is only a well-forgotten old thing. I believe that those phenomena that have been considered new since about 2020 (the emergence of tensions between the collective West and Russia, the United States and China) were really just a continuation of major trends and events observed back in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the fundamental prerequisites were laid down for the third decade of the 21st century to present us with a very tough, competitive and dangerous world. Nothing is accidental or unpredictable. The law of the rise and fall of great powers, which has been in effect for centuries, will also be in effect in the twenty-first century.

How to behave in such an unstable and dangerous world? Most likely, the right strategy is not to swing from one extreme to another, but to try to hedge risks, maximize internal stress tolerance, seek balance in everything and draw on the common sense, not on ideologemes if possible.

In this context, I want to touch briefly on the question of sovereignty. There is much debate about sovereignty; it is now trendy to declare that sovereignty must be complete. However, it is clear that sovereignty, like freedom, is never absolute. A society can be open or closed, there is autocracy. If a society opens up to the outside world, then naturally there is the question of vulnerability to external competitors. How closed or open does one have to be? Should we turn import substitution into re-creation of our life only in the domestic contour? I think it is very important to understand that the twenty-first century, like the twentieth century, will be the century of nation-states, and the institution of the nation-state will remain the foundation of those mechanisms by which the issues of global governance and regulation and the development of regional structures will be addressed.

In the European Union, in the United States and in Russia, there is talk of political, economic, technological and informational sovereignty. Such talk is justified, but how can one put it together with the fact that no center of power can unilaterally solve issues that concern its national interests? This is where the notion of alliances – regional or transregional – comes into play. Alliances act as a multiplier using which the state (or states) that has become the core of the alliance can achieve what it wants and shape the world according to its own convenient rules.

In this sense, great examples are France and Germany, which have managed to create around themselves what is now called the European Union – the largest economy on the planet. Apparently, this will be the main tool of their efforts for the benefit of themselves and their allies in the 21st century.

China is looking for its own path. Although the development of this state-civilization is now on the rise, it will not be able to exist on its own. For that reason, China is systematically, with great effort, forming a whole mechanism

through which dozens of other countries can help it become the largest center of power.

Finally, Russia. Our country also has potential multipliers. These could be the Union State, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and other mechanisms through which non-Western centers of power can be drawn into our orbit, or we can insert ourselves in their orbit. I am referring primarily to BRICS, SCO, OPEC+, and ASEAN+.

A few closing remarks. First, in my view, the neoliberal model of globalization is completely a thing of the past. Second, we are already living in a polycentric world, but we do not yet understand how polycentrism will develop. This can be either polycentrism acting under the jungle law, or polycentrism where states respect each other. Third, there is a strategic disconnect between the U.S. and Europe, although it is now being obscured by their consolidation around the events in Ukraine. It is also absolutely clear that the U.S. is on course to unleash a new cold war with China. This is their strategy for many years to come.

And one last thing. Can we say that we are witnessing the formation of a new bipolarity? There is a widespread belief that the U.S. and China are the new centers of world power, to which other countries will adjoin. I believe that we are probably dealing with an analytical trap, because a polycentric world cannot simultaneously be a world of a new bipolarity. I don't see how the new bipolarity would include Russia, India, and other countries that such a system would make dependent, driven, and certainly unable to shape the world around them according to rules that benefit them and not others.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Alexei Anatolyevich went beyond Europe in his speech, and I give the floor to Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Naumkin, President of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; hope that he too will not limit himself to the East, although the East is very interesting to us.

**V. V. NAUMKIN:** – The East is very large, and it probably won't be hard to stay within the boundaries of this topic. However, I want to build on what Alexei Anatolyevich Gromyko said. I don't think we need to get carried away with predictions right now. Whether Russia ranks fifth, sixth, or eighth, the citizens of the country, by and large, do not care. What matters to them is a sufficient level of comfort of living, adherence to the norms and values to which our society is accustomed.

However, since the question of ranking has been raised, perhaps we should look at the possible position of states that are primarily within the orbit of our influence – the countries of the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and some others. How will the situation develop in these regions? There are a number of disturbing trends there that we sometimes undeservedly neglect. Konstantin Fedorovich probably understands better than anyone else what difficulties I am talking about.

Also, in my opinion, our national priorities should include increasing Russia's economical, political and cultural appeal. In this context, we had both achievements and failures. Of course, sanctions set us back, to some extent. However, I believe that we will cope with their consequences, and we need to focus primarily on the other problem.

This is the problem of interaction with neighboring countries, including eastern countries, which I have emphasized by mentioning Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Undoubtedly, Russia's relations with the Islamic world, along with Russian-Chinese relations, are a key area of foreign policy that requires special attention. Probably Russian-Chinese relations are not free of problems either, and different scenarios are possible, just as Alexei Anatolyevich said. Our interests do not always align, and we should get used to some asymmetry in relations with China, especially since it is a particularly important partner for us as a major provider of services and goods. It is very important not to concede on certain issues, and, on the contrary, to rely on China in others, if we can be sure that this will not violate our sovereignty.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Can we rely on China?

**V. V. NAUMKIN:** – Generally, yes, we can. However, we have to keep our ear to the ground, which I think we sometimes lack.

Everywhere, just as in the CIS, there are lobbyists for the interests of other states of the world, and it is very important to understand what they want and how they will use what they want, including in their internal political struggle. Alexei Anatolyevich correctly noted that Russia needs a certain amount of over-cautiousness, or risk hedging. I would say that it is more about reassurance, so that our partners, especially in the East, are confident that working with Russia is not detrimental to their national interests. Representatives of the CIS countries also have such concerns, which they often share in private conversations. We need to figure out how to convince potential allies that Russia poses no threat to them, how to get them to cooperate with us rather than with our adversaries. In my opinion, this issue is not given the attention it deserves.

Yesterday we touched the topic of conflict with the environment. It escalated, and the world became noticeably more vulnerable. There has been an unprecedented amount of fires, floods, droughts and other natural disasters. Given the vast area of our country, we can feel more confident than others: if one part of the state is affected, others will probably remain unscathed. On the other hand, there must be a well-thought-out strategy for dealing with the environment, tailored to the vision of the situation as a whole. An environmental conflict leads to all kinds of diseases, and I suppose we should expect more pandemics and epidemics.

So far, no one at the Conference has talked about our relationship with space. Meanwhile, our opponents are eagerly accusing Russia of polluting space. As far as I know, the Americans have special programs on this issue, directly targeting Russia. Here, too, an ideological war is being waged, in which I believe us to be inferior. The problems of space, including its militarization, should not be overlooked.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Dmitry Olegovich Rogozin suggested decorating rockets with Gzhel and Khokhloma painting.

**B. V. NAUMKIN:** – That is a wonderful idea.

Unfortunately, the idea of the Russian world has lost its significance. As I mentioned earlier, our country is not attractive enough for the world community. Frankly speak-

ing, we are lazy to promote the idea of the Russian world, we turn a blind eye to the shortcomings that exist in this direction. We need to appeal to our common history – common not only with the countries of the CIS, but also with the Eastern Europe. Yesterday I already mentioned the effectiveness of meanings associated with it. There are people in different states who cherish the legacy of victors in World War II – it's their war, and of course ours, too. We should use it to our benefit.

Let me emphasize: in a polycentric system, it is necessary to create alliances and look for allies. On the one hand, of course, the world's shift toward polycentricity weakens the West against the non-West. On the other hand, polycentricity brings threats with it. Take the not-always-easy relationship between Russia and Turkey. Turkey is a very important partner for us, and there are many other states with which it is fundamentally important to establish contact, despite all the difficulties that arise along the way.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Thank you, dear colleagues. I want to ask you (primarily those who have already spoken) two questions. We stand against unipolarity and for multipolarity, polycentricity. But is there a risk that polycentricity will become a war of all against all? That's the first question. My second question was prompted by Vitaly Vyacheslavovich's words. When we talk about our allies, we usually mean former republics of the USSR. But are these states really our friends or are they hidden, semi-concealed, or even overt opponents of our strengthening? For example, a currently prominent Armenian political figure (I will not share his last name) said that Armenia was against Russia's victory in Ukraine because this would lead to restoration of the Soviet Union.

**I. I. BUZOVSKY:** – As a representative of one of the former Soviet republics, in response to the question about the preference for polycentricity or unipolarity, I would like to say that if we dominated, then we would definitely advocate unipolarity. Further on, a decision would be made to delegate authority, etc. The struggle reveals the need for dominance; now we need to think about the methods of work and struggle.

All of the former Soviet republics are searching for their place, trying to figure out their path. The speeches that we have already heard fit within this understanding, but at a higher level of generalization, a question arises: which is more important – the spiritual or the material? Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Naumkin spoke about the need to promote the idea of the "Russian world," the ties based on our common history, etc. It's not just the economy that's important, but also the goal, the understanding of where we're going and what we're fighting for.

Today, in a very difficult period, we can say that our adversaries, or to put it bluntly, enemies, have been bribed; that is, they have been drawn into the unipolar flow for money. But it must be understood that this is not as much of a bribe as shaping of a context in which they believed in a strategy and ideology that helps them move in a direction that does not suit us today.

If we talk about the Republic of Belarus, we are still analyzing the causes of the protests that took place in our country in 2020–2021, trying to answer the question of how it could have happened. Why did the relationship that deve-

loped between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus lead to the need for intervention? And once again I would like to thank Russia for its assistance (and I am not only talking about its armed component).

We need to formulate strategies and think about where we are going. Head-on advertising, news block, speaking from the strong position when one dominates and the others listen, are the technologies of the last century. In 2020, almost all PR agencies in Belarus took the other side. PR affects the unconscious, so it should be an integral part of our work. Calculation does not work in relationships; another thing matters – that the information gets to the heart, affecting the unconscious. We need to switch to values and ideals, talk about what we mean by them and articulate our activities in general.

To summarize, the search for a development strategy and the definition of values that should consolidate us lie at the heart of the answer to the question about polycentricity and unipolarity. We advocate multipolarity, common values, but we must understand where we are going, perhaps even under a common flag.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – One gets the impression that we cannot get out of a vicious circle: values, path choices, ideology – it’s all about the future, as if without understanding what will happen to us tomorrow, we cannot move forward. We think we’re the smartest, so we have to know where we’re going to end up. Our life resembles the movement of a train that runs on rails along a given route. But we are not a train, we are people endowed with principles – these are traditional values that are enshrined in the founding documents. They are obvious and simple, they contain a philosophical, ideological basis that was being created for thousands of years. It is a state based on a family consisting of a man and a woman giving birth to girls and boys, not individuals of the middle gender. We have defined the form of organization of the society (from the initial cell to the top) and enshrined it in the founding documents.

The development path suggests that a person works and gets remunerated according to the results of work and creative effort (which suggests freedom, etc.). Money, obtained by any means and used as a tool, is in no way a supreme value.

I agree with Igor Ivanovich that we need to explain ideas to people using simple words. Remuneration for work, not greed for the sake of accumulation and power. Everything can be spelled out like in the song “Where does the Motherland begin?” But we believe that in our high society we should not speculate about such trivial things.

Sergey Ivanovich mentioned that *Huawei* will not supply communications equipment to the Russian Federation because they were pressured by the Americans. But that’s probably not entirely true, because we only have data from open sources, while there are classified sources as well. In addition, we should keep in mind that we tend to react emotionally.

I believe that it is necessary to work with all parties on all issues. Example – despite all disagreements, the US sent a delegation to *Venezuela* that met with representatives of Nicolas Maduro’s government. And Russia needs to do the same.

How have Russia’s relations with China evolved over the past 20 years? Our elite stigmatized this direction. This is

why there are virtually no Russian media correspondents in China. There are only 1.5 representatives of Russian media per 1.4 billion Chinese, a huge number of provinces speaking different languages. And how many of our correspondents do we have in Europe? Our media describe in great detail who said what, as if it were of value, given that the European Union countries have a unified foreign policy, and it is not formed in Brussels. Russia manifests the same attitude toward other parts of the world: zero attention to Africa and Asia in terms of media, both externally and internally.

In a conversation with the heads of channels and other personalities who determine the broadcasting schedule, one person confided to me that he was afraid of China because it is very incomprehensible. The Russian economic elite argued that it had no possibility of supplying products from China, even though we already had the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Mainline.

To make the Chinese destination attractive, we could increase funding and engage marketing. Instead we use the *port of Hamburg* as the most important hub opening the way to the *ports* of other regions of the world, and we pay them a lot of money, despite the fact that the Russian-Chinese border is the second longest in Russia and we have a railroad. Supplying goods by rail, we would feed the whole country via that direction.

For 20 years, our economic elite has done everything to alienate people from China, scaring us with the return of the “shuttle traders,” who, by the way, ensured survival of the population in the difficult 1990s. Now the “shuttles” will not carry plaid bags but nice briefcases; but in many ways they will repeat the same path. Small and medium-sized businesses supplying products to Europe and transferring money there were not given the opportunity to take a pragmatic look at the Chinese direction.

Now we should disregard the nuances that are inflated by our elite and cited as an example that we have nothing to do in China. We need to look into this direction. We finally figured it out.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Thank you, Maria Vladimirovna. I give the floor to Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev.

**S. Yu. GLAZYEV:** – In answer to Konstantin Fedorovich’s question, I would like to say that there will be no war of all against all because of the high degree of interconnectedness in international economic relations. We are now experiencing this interconnectedness, and so does China. The concept of the new world economic order is focused on close ties, because it is not about freedom of trade and movement of money, but rather about joint investment cooperation. I fully agree with Maria Vladimirovna who is in favor of expanding cooperation with Asia.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – Sergey Yuryevich, this is I who agrees with you: your ideas are dressed in calculations, supported by statistics and presented in a pragmatic way. In response to journalist K. Remchukov’s question about whether we are afraid that China and Asia will betray Russia, I replied that Europe has betrayed us more than once. Potentially, we should not only calculate, but also factor in these risks and keep working together. We face betrayal all the time, and every time we go back to the traitors. It’s time to stop.



**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Maria Vladimirovna, Emperor Alexander III answered these questions by saying that Russia has only two allies: the army and the navy.

**S. Yu. GLAZYEV:** – I would like to draw attention to the fact that China was once comfortable doing business with the United States, but they sobered up after the trade war that Trump announced.” Xi Jinping’s financial advisers, with whom I was in close contact, did not believe that sanctions would be imposed against them. It was a revelation to them at that time. And now they look at the world very differently and are dumping dollar reserves.

I would like to revert Konstantin Fedorovich’s question about allies to the Russian side. Maria Vladimirovna talks about bilateral relations, but within SCO, the Americans, together with the Bank for International Settlements, are already forming (and one might say, imposing) 20 agendas. Representatives of the Russian Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank sign documents without even reading them. That is, we need to propose initiatives, especially in the SCO, which is open for dialogue. China and India are waiting for us to take the initiative because they (even with their enormous size and power) do not have the international experience that Russia has, but they will soon stop waiting.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – I give the floor to Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak.

**S. I. KISLYAK:** – It is necessary to understand the problems that we will face and start working on them today. This includes helping the Chinese to overcome boundaries before they go beyond their world in which they have taken a leap, but are already looking at new horizons. China was counting on a change for the better when D. Trump would no longer be a president. Indeed, things have gradually got milder, but the process has not been reversed. We need to remember what the Chinese are focused on and what they fear, because objectively Russia needs allies who can help build the new world order. And China, of course, is our number one goal in this regard. I doubt that our Chinese friends are interested in a bipolar world. They are ambitious, but their mentality is such that they will not take risks and are realistically assessing their capabilities. They are not interested in running the world, which means taking responsibility for it, and the Chinese are not ready for that yet. They are interested in working with us, and Russia should not miss this chance.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – In Russia, there is a perception that millions of Chinese are just waiting for an opportunity to cross the border and invade Siberia. However, it should be made clear that China has always been concerned about one problem: how to feed their huge population. There is a Temple of Heaven in Beijing where the emperor offered a sacrifice every year, asking for a good harvest. The aggressiveness of the Chinese is tempered by an understanding of the need for a peaceful life, which is necessary in order to feed a huge number of people.

I was surprised to learn what the Chinese call Russians.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – Europeans, according to the Chinese, are long-nosed barbarians.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Chinese newspapers describe Russians as a belligerent nation. And it is a cause for reflection: to what extent it is a compliment and to what extent a warning.

I give the floor to Pavel Nikolaevich Gusev, editor-in-chief of *Moskovsky Komsomolets*.

**P. N. GUSEV:** – Maria Vladimirovna said that Russian media are practically not represented in China. About 15 years ago, as head of the Union of Journalists of Russia, I tried to open a number of Russian-language publications in China through various structures and departments. In the PRC, everything to do with journalism is under control of the Chinese Communist Party; there is no private initiative in terms of propaganda, information, or anything to do with the word. It would take an appropriate decision of the Central Committee of the Party and execution of a large number of documents, the meaning of which did not correspond to the motives with which we wanted to enter China. It was impossible to overcome the barriers, at least in that period. That’s when we gave up staff reporters as well.

As for the development of relations between Russia and China, I recall a meeting of the Moscow government when Mayor Luzhkov categorically stated that there would be no Chinatown or Chinese in Moscow.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – I give the floor to Elena Vladimirovna Kharitonova, Senior Researcher at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

**E. V. KHARITONOVA:** – In our discussions, we periodically move from economic and political issues to ideological, ethical, moral, worldview issues, often mentioning “the Russian world.”

When Igor Ivanovich asked what we were fighting for and where we were going, Maria Vladimirovna answered: “Why do we need to know where we’re going?”

I have great respect for Maria Vladimirovna, but I want to argue with what was said at the plenary session that ideology is when a person wants to live in his country. After all, a targeted selection can be made, such as the one recently announced in higher education: we are not forming a creator, but a consumer. That is, it is possible to breed a kind of people who will be comfortable in one society but uncomfortable in another. Many of you probably remember John Calhoun’s Universe-25 experiment conducted in the 1960s and 1970s on rodents, when they were placed in incredibly comfortable conditions, but at some point they all degenerated and died.

Speaking of the “Russian world” and ethics, which is part of culture, determines the worldview component of the governance cycle and is therefore under constant attack in hybrid warfare (both externally and internally), I would like to formulate dilemmas characteristic of our type of ethics:

- the general over the particular (formerly, the public over the personal);
- justice over the law (as we know, our strength is in the truth);
- the spiritual over the material;
- power over property (Maria Vladimirovna also mentioned this);
- service over possession.

These dilemmas are not imposed on Russian ethics, but were shaped in the course of traditional development. As a representative of the Institute for African Studies, I can say that these principles are close to the traditional African ethical system. This model was attractive to Third World countries (those who needed justice, a new world order in the sense not of a new economic system but of an ethical system), which from the Anglo-Saxon point of view have always been peripheral, unlike the metropolises, for which this model is destructive because it undermines their foundations. And in many ways this is why the Soviet project to decolonize Africa was successful.

In the days of the Soviet Union, we had something to offer the world, and so this model was a success. But yesterday, a question arose at the plenary session: why, with the strongest ideology and observance of the moral code, did the USSR disintegrate?

Civilizational development has the form of a spindle in which there is a lower part – traditional, an upper part – strategy, goals and objectives of development, and a middle part – existential, oftentimes overlooked. If we only bet on the lower part – the tradition – we go below the waterline and the ship sinks. If we neglect history and focus only on the top of the spindle, the boat turns over. If we lack the existential part, the basic part, it causes discontent. It is especially so if there is a penetration of knowledge about another way of life, which after the lifting of the Iron Curtain began to destroy us, both spontaneously and purposefully. The strength is in the balance, the golden mean in our tradition, the way of the Tao in the Eastern, Eurasian tradition, which we are now betting on, the truth in my view and understanding.

I am a member of the executive committee of the World Federation of Scientific Workers. In 1946, F. Joliot-Curie created it as an organization of scientists who should be responsible for the fate of the world in connection with their discoveries. This happened after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And to this day, members of this organization still talk about disarmament. But in the established order of the unipolar world, disarmament is out of the question. A striking example is the DPRK, which is developing nuclear weapons (these are weapons of deterrence that imply the possibility of striking an enemy), and Muammar Gaddafi, who has abandoned the nuclear project. Africa could be a mirror of the events we are facing right now.

One nuance related to the paradox of disarmament is noteworthy. Before Gorbachev, the two poles of the bipolar world had about 30,000 warheads, which, indeed, could have led to a nuclear winter, the destruction of humanity. Everyone understood that. After the arms reduction, the Western elite had the illusion, which still persists, that it is possible to survive a nuclear war by equipping a bunker, etc. Fear of the possibility of a strike diminished.

We are striving for a multipolar world. Globalization implies concentration of funds and management capabilities in a single center. And if we are talking about centers of power, the key word here is “power,” that is, this center must be strong on the outer circuit as well as on the inner circuit. And the outer circuit is not just about military force. We know that hybrid warfare is waged at different levels, the first of which (educational system, memory of the war and heroes, the monuments) is constantly under attack – historically, factually, and ideologically. The se-

cond level – financial and economic (Bretton Woods system, sanctions, etc.) – is a powerful weapon in a hybrid war. The next level is military (peacekeeping operations, special operations, war against the gene pool through alcoholization, drug stuff, etc.).

We must be strong in order to be able to claim our sovereignty.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – I give the floor to Irina Olegovna Abramova, Director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

**I. O. ABRAMOVA:** – June 9 is the 350th anniversary of the birth of Peter the Great. Our history (including polycentricity and multipolarity) might have turned out differently if the expedition to Madagascar that Peter the Great had planned in 1723 at the suggestion of Vice-Admiral Daniel Jacob Wilster had taken place (but the ships got a leak and returned to Revel). The situation is similar with the Republic of South Africa.

Why is Africa always on the periphery in all areas of our relations with other countries? Because it is practically absent from the information space. From January 25 to February 2, 2022, we conducted a study that found that the percentage of mentions of the U.S. in our media at that time was 14% and Africa (54 states) less than 0.5%. And this a relatively high figure because it was at the time of the coup in Burkina Faso, the discussion of Wagner’s private military campaign, S. V. Lavrov’s commentary, the announcement of the exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa, and the African Football Championship. Now the figure is less than 0.01%.

Maria Vladimirovna also touched on this topic in her speech. There are five TASS offices in Africa: three in North Africa, one in South Africa and one in Kenya. In other words, all of sub-Saharan Africa is not covered by Russian information, so all of its countries receive information about Russia from the Western media, which shapes their public opinion along with other sources, although at the level of ministers and top leaders they make curtsies in favor of Russia. Incidentally, Eritrea is one of the countries, besides Syria, Belarus and North Korea, that did not support the U.S.-Ukrainian resolution. And our closest surrounding, the Eurasian Economic Union, abstained from voting for fear of sanctions. Eritrea is ruled by a dictator, but in geostrategic terms this country is interesting for Russia.

A few words on why we should look to Africa as another emerging pole of development. First, the young population of Africa (under 25 years old) accounts for 60%. This is our future, as young people generate the main demand for modern goods and services. Second, beginning in 2040, the growth of the middle class – the main consumer – will occur not in Asia, but in Africa. Third is the security issues. Creation of the new AUKUS bloc (a defense alliance between Australia, Britain and the United States) has created a huge territory involving the African continent. We should also look at Africa from the point of view of placing new points of counteraction to Russia there. Negotiations are already underway with Kenya and South Africa. Finally, Africa is 54 countries, that is, 54 UN votes.

Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev expressed his fear that Russia will become the periphery of China. We constantly turn exclusively in one direction, now to the West, now to the

East (China and India), whereas Africa is absent from Russia's field of vision. In order to effectively implement policies and avoid becoming peripheral, Russia needs to consider more players.

Sergey Yuryevich also spoke about the formation of a new system of global settlements. Africans are very interested in this system, including national currencies and real exchange goods, because they, like Russia, have 35% of the world's resources necessary to produce high-tech goods. If we talk about digital currencies, we can learn from Africa, because the first online payment in the world was made in Kenya and not in the West, Rwanda abandoned paper money, etc.

Elena Grigoryevna, what is the number of women in the State Duma?

**E. G. DRAPEKO:** – 14%.

**I. O. ABRAMOVA:** – And in Rwanda – 64%, in South Africa – 35%. Among other things, they pay great attention to the role of women.

We should start from the other side. Everything that is happening today in Russia and Belarus has previously been tested on Africa: colonial technology, turning into a raw materials' appendage of the West, working with young people and unleashing "color" revolutions (with the involvement of youth, network transmission of information, involvement of children).

Everything that happens in science was also done in Africa: tying African science to Western science, brain drain, grants in fields where Africans have reached a certain level (primarily epidemiology and medicine). According to public records, there are 45 U.S. biological laboratories in 20 countries in Africa. Think of the large number of infectious diseases in Africa and how this fact can be manipulated. In terms of our biosecurity, this is also extremely important.

Another technology that has been tried in Africa is the destruction of national identity, the abandonment of the national language that shapes thinking. All African countries are either Francophones, or Anglophones, or use Portuguese, Arabic and Spanish (we are talking about black Africa).

Igor Ivanovich spoke about the technologies of manipulating public consciousness – they have also been tried in Africa. I worked with African migrants for many years through the Council of Europe, and I have seen how representatives of this organization act, using linguistic methods inter alia.

We have to think strategically, and we're always a little behind. China has become a great power, and now we are friends with it. And in 1990, when no one paid attention to China in Russia, the country's GDP (\$389 billion) was comparable to that of Ukraine (\$293 billion).

Africa is the continent of the twenty-first century, and if we disregard it today, we could lose a lot in terms of allies and future development. In relation to Africa, we should talk about technology rather than trade. Russia has the technology that Africa needs and that we can offer to the huge, rapidly developing market for the young generation. And then both Russia and the African continent will be successful. In terms of ideology, we have affinity to their two theses – sovereignty and justice.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Irina Olegovna, I support everything you just said – probably as do many people here. In the Soviet Union, it was believed that the Soviet Union's best friends were the oppressed peoples of Africa.

**E. G. DRAPEKO:** – Africans would like to send a delegation to Russia and establish contacts at least at the level of culture, but there is resistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – The Foreign Ministry, as stated by Minister Lavrov and repeatedly by the ministry itself, is now redistributing human resources. The departments in charge of Asian and African relations will be strengthened by new resources, but this cannot be done overnight.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – I give the floor to Academician Valery Alexandrovich Chereshnev, Chief Researcher at the Institute of Immunology and Physiology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

**V. A. CHERESHNEV:** – In connection with the celebration of the anniversary of Peter the Great, I want to say that it was he who invented the brain drain, inviting 17 prominent scientists from four countries (Switzerland, Germany, France, England) to Russia to create St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences and Arts (the forerunner of the Academy of Sciences). Since none of the foreigners knew Russian at the time, Peter placed his physician-in-ordinary, Lavrenty Lavrentyevich Blumentrost, as president and interpreter over them. In the middle of the 18th century, the number of foreign and Russian scholars was equalized. Perhaps we should follow the example of Peter the Great: do what is expedient.

People before the twentieth century lived with a sense of their own immortality. Even though there were wars, epidemics, and cataclysms, humanity recovered itself and grew in numbers. The first bell rang in August 1945, when the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then it became clear that this was a self-destruction mechanism which would leave nothing alive. A few decades later, a second bell rang – the environmental crisis.

In the 1930s, Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky created the doctrine of the noosphere. The technogenic pressure, which began in the middle of the 18th century and has been going on for 240 years (and we are now at the peak of the technosphere), is increasing and will inevitably lead to self-destruction of the humanity.

In 2002, the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development dedicated to the conservation of the planet's nature was held in South Africa, discussing comprehensive environmental programs and the transition to zero-waste closed-cycle production. Everybody understood that there could be an environmental crisis, and a sum of contributions was agreed upon to solve the problem of release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. But the U.S., leader in the emissions, has blocked its accession. And it ended in 2002 without even having begun.

Health is essential. In Africa, life expectancy in the mid-1990s was 54–55 years, in Japan it was close to 80 years, and in Russia it reached 70 years. And today the average life expectancy in Japan is 85 years, in the United States – 80, in Scandinavian countries – 82, in developed countries –

82–83, and in Russia – 72. Besides, Russia has the largest difference between life expectancy of men and women: as a rule, the difference is 1–3 years, and in Russia it is 11–12 years (our men live on average 66–67 years, and women 78–79 years).

According to scientific data, there should be at least 10–12 years between retirement age and the age of living. One can retire at 70 if the average life expectancy is 82–84. But if, on average, people live 67 years and retire at 65, that has to be explained somehow and there should be a scientifically-based response.

Unfortunately, in Russia, since 2014 there has been a systematic destruction of the Academy of Sciences and its transformation into a social club. In the West, academies are not government-run, but non-governmental. Membership in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences is valued at \$100, for which a member receives four issues of their journal a year and must attend two general meetings. Members of Western academies are not academicians, but Doctors of Philosophy or Professors. In Russia, starting from Peter the Great's time, the Academy of Sciences, which was called the Vasileostrovsky Vatican, because it was located on Vasilyevsky Island, encompassed the intellectual elite.

It is not uncommon now to say that the Academy of Sciences is an obsolete form of organization. For instance, China created its Academy of Sciences after the template of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1949. But the PRC had appropriate funding. Where the system is in place and science is given enough attention, the academic form is effective and quite capable.

The Russian Institute of Immunology and Physiology and the Chinese Institute of Microbiology and Immunology in Harbin signed an agreement in 1990. At that time, our conditions were comparable: 150 employees and two two-story buildings. Now China has five 20-story institutes and one research laboratory, 1,500 employees; while we are still left with our 150 people. Besides, China has a biotechnology building that is half-full, as workplaces there await for young professionals to return from Europe and the United States and develop areas related to vaccinology and immunoglobulins. A popular slogan in China today calls for all those who have been trained to return to their native country.

Another important problem of our time is the proliferation of biolaboratories. For example, there are 60 such laboratories in Africa, 8 in Georgia, 40 in China, etc. Nature creates pathogenic strains, and laboratories upgrade them to higher pathogenicity levels. Recently, they started studying bats, and it turned out that they are saturated with highly pathogenic strains, just like monkeys, but don't get sick because there are no receptors on their lymphocytes that can pick up viruses. And humans have receptor proteins; once in the body, the virus begins to multiply, causing disease and death.

A few words about polymorbidity and comorbidity. Polymorbidity is the presence of several synchronous diseases in an individual in different phases and stages of development. By the age of 60, a person (no matter what country he or she lives in – Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, or Russia) accumulates a bunch of diseases (atherosclerosis, cholecystitis, arthritis, etc.). In the body they do not interfere, but balance each other; the main thing is to avoid exacerbations. A powerful viral infection turns out to be a stimulant

that triggers chronic processes. As a result, one comorbid disease provokes all the chronic ones.

Let us look at the difference in statistical data in Russia and in the West concerning the number of deaths from COVID-19. Let's say a person died of a myocardial infarction, but a PCR test showed that he had COVID-19. However, "heart attack complicated by coronavirus" is cited as the cause. And it has to be vice versa, because COVID-19 triggered the heart attack. Were it not for COVID-19, the heart attack could have been managed. That is why statistics show 370,000 deaths in Russia and 1 million in the United States. However, when the data for two years were analyzed in Russia, it turned out that there was an increase of 985,000 deaths. You can't fool the numbers.

A polycentric world is necessary, but there are certain advantages to a monocentric world as well. The main thing is to solve problems in all important areas, including education.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – In the State Duma, I represent the city of Sochi where we have a popular saying, 'The rescue of a drowning man is the drowning man's own job.' If the Academy of Sciences is unable to solve problems on its own, there is no one to blame. Can't a large number of respectable people organize themselves to prove their case and the right of the academy to exist? What happened to the Academy of Sciences is wrong. As a historian by profession, I am well aware of the significance of the Academy of Sciences and the path that it has taken in its development.

I give the floor to Sergey Alexeevich Tsyplýaev, member of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy.

**S. A. TSYPLÝAEV:** – The anniversary of Peter the Great is a good time to talk about the fact that today, in the twenty-first century, the window to Europe is being shut – quite tight, as it seems – in anticipation of frost. At the same time, for several years the Russian elite has been repeating that we will now turn to the warm East: it will be the destination for our export products, finance and technology will flow to us from there, and China will be our loyal friend. I agree that for quite a long time no one was interested in China economically: only in 2009 did we list Rusal on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and the first pipelines were not laid there until 2011, when a supply agreement was signed between Rosneft and China's CNPC.

And now we are astonished to see China pursuing a policy that is not in our interest. How come? And it's not just the HUAWEI story. Ban on double-registered planes, refusal to supply spare parts for planes, airbuses, upcoming withdrawal of the Chinese company from the Arctic LNG-2 project...

In my view, our frustrations stem from the fact that although we talk about multipolarity, that is not what we really mean. Multipolarity is nothing more than the antithesis of unipolarity, and in fact, we want to be at least the second pole and still see the world as a bipolar system. If China has a problematic relationship with America, we think the Chinese should be our friends.

In believing so, however, we disregard China's history, culture, and stance. A country, which at times produced up to 40% of the world's GDP, which considered itself the center of the world and all others as tributaries, will never be a loyal ally who will support you to its own disadvan-

tage. It is telling that when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared in China in the 19th century, it was called the Ministry for the Administration of All Peoples' Affairs. This is how China perceives itself. And now they are saying, walk beside us if you want to; if you don't want, don't come. Nothing more than that.

I remember that at one of the forums of the St. Petersburg Dialogue series, General L. G. Ivashov said that a powerful anti-American military bloc will be created, which will include Russia, India, and China. In response to the experts' snide question about who would lead this bloc, he replied with a smile, "Russia, of course." And he proceeded to talk about our advantages which would make other participants accept it. So right now I wouldn't hold out much hope for China. However, it would be wrong to say that the Chinese are not ready to take responsibility. In all recent conferences (and in China, too) where I have had the opportunity to talk to them, they have constantly been pursuing the same idea: the world is now dependent on two centers, the United States and China, and the relationship between these countries determines what the world will look like in the future. They agree to be friends with Russia – why not? They say, you have such a large territory, so many extractable resources. This is their attitude that we have to reckon with.

Again, out of habit, we do not perceive China as a separate center of power, and our multipolarity does not seem to extend beyond the two poles. Once, at a meeting of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Sergey Lavrov delivered a rather long and heartfelt speech about the need for equality of all states in the world. I asked the question: then how do we look at the right of veto in the UN Security Council? It is a special position of the five countries, not equality. He said it was right, that's how it should be. And this, too, shows that we do not envisage any more poles, moreover – we deny even the EU to be a pole, considering that it goes in the fairway of America. I don't think we are ready to reconsider our attitude to "multipolarity."

And what is our strategic objective? To be universally recognized as a pole, military power alone is not enough – you have to be a powerful economic and cultural center. But what is our task in the economy today? We have actually begun to re-industrialize, because to be in the post-industrial world bypassing the industrial phase is not possible, it is an illusion. And we cannot rely solely on agriculture, clean water and tourism. This, of course, is all necessary and good, but it means a complete change in our national character, which is hardly possible.

Let us recall how industrialization occurred in the Soviet Union. It was not written in our textbooks that Stalin invited the American architect Albert Kahn who received orders for huge sums and built more than 500 factories here. The Stalingrad Tractor Plant was cut in America, brought here and assembled; the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant was a copy of the plant in Gary, Indiana, etc. Dnieper hydroelectric power plant was designed by the Americans, who also built 15 of the 16 turbines; the generators were made by the Germans; Uralmash was fully fitted with Western equipment. One could go on and on: there are American blast furnaces in the shops of Magnitka; the Demag German forging press launched in the 1930s was stopped only in the early 2000s. This is not a reason to dust our heads with ashes – it is clear that for that time, it was the only possi-

ble solution. If the proponents of total import substitution had won in those years, what would we have by 1941? With Mosin rifles. Today is the same story – if we try import substituting everything, the country may find itself in an extremely difficult situation.

The question is, what is China's interest? It is not interested in Russia as an industrial competitor. China is now an industrial factory for the United States, trying to take over the market in Europe completely, and it is not willing to sacrifice its position to help us in whatever it may be. It is absolutely pragmatic in its actions. We had (I don't know if we still have) a chance to reindustrialize the country on the basis of domestic business with the help of Western technology and Central Asian labor. On this list, getting technology is a matter of life and death.

My work history includes the position of a scientific secretary of the largest defense research institute in the country, so I know the price of complacency. It is impossible to replace high-tech imports in one fell swoop. We remember how this happened in the previous years and how many lives it cost, for example, in Afghanistan, when a night vision device was needed, but it could not be made, despite all efforts of engineers and heroes of socialist labor. In reality things look different than in dreams and talks.

A few comments on general discussion of ideology. I am very concerned about the emergence of a "new religion" in ideology; its adherents say that everything in this world was organized and done by Americans because they are almighty. I call them the cult of American worshippers. Such speeches instill in us a helplessness that stifles our initiative, ability, intelligence, etc. These are no better than stories about how detestable the West is. We're good, we offer great solutions, but they reject everything. It turns out that Russia is the unfortunate victim of villains. This, too, is nothing more than learned helplessness.

Colleagues have rightly reminded us of the attitudes that guided China at the beginning of its spectacular rise. The Chinese did not accuse the West and did not try to change the rules of interaction with it, but used these rules to their advantage as much as possible. The wise Deng Xiaoping said that no country in the world, regardless of its political structure, is able to carry out modernization if it implements a closed-door policy. Another wisdom of Deng Xiaoping is to hide one's true intentions and keep a low profile, that is, not to impose one's will on anyone, not to get involved in conflicts, but instead to make every effort to develop internally; this is a measure of the effectiveness of foreign policy as well.

I cannot agree that India and China will soon become world leaders in GDP because technology is still generated in the West. The only country that is not a net importer of technology is the United States. Even the Japanese who successfully industrialized themselves were not able to do anything in the field of technology and eventually remained users. Creating technology is a very complicated business, so we should not expect India and China to inspire us with their example of achieving world leadership through simply flooding the world with cheap goods.

In conclusion, I would like to address today's jubilee again. It is known that Peter invited European scientists to Russia, borrowed technology, sent children of the nobility to Europe to study, and went there himself for the same purpose. As Pushkin wrote, "all flags will be our guests." It

feels like we want to disprove the rightness of both Peter the Great and Stalin and perform a miracle – a breakthrough in the conditions of isolation. I'm afraid it will cost huge and unreasonable money, and China won't help.

As for a multipolar world, we have a great illustration of our readiness for it. In St. Petersburg there is an Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS countries, whose rules stipulate regular re-election of the chairman with mandatory rotation. So, since 1994, the "rotation" has taken place in such a way that the chairman is always a representative of the Russian Federation. So let us have no illusions. If we really want a multipolar world, we will have to change a lot in our lives and minds.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – To begin with, I would like to clarify that we never said that we were going to develop multipolarity within the CIS, otherwise there would have been madness. By the way, multipolarity in the CIS was also proposed by those who organized the GUAM Union (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) along with the CIS and are still trying to make Ukraine an entity that can confront Russia. This was the attempt to create multipolarity in the CIS. So Russia's actual chairmanship of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly is quite logical.

As for Stalin's industrialization, many people know how it was carried out. For example, I studied this process when I was in graduate school. I will not argue with you, my only objection is that we were too late then. By 1941, it was too late to develop cooperative ties with Germany, although German industrial equipment would have greatly helped our industry. In my opinion, 1941 in relations with Germany is about the same as 2022 in relations with the United States. It would be strange to invite American specialists now, although they could be very helpful.

As a member of the State Duma, I can tell you about the actions the government feels due to be taken first and foremost in the current situation. Parliament, like the president, has quite a lot of confidence in the government in this regard. In the first package of measures, for example, it is proposed to adjust the duties. So, purchase of a car from a foreign brand was subject to a luxury tax if its value exceeded 3 million rubles. Now it is proposed to raise the limit to 10 million. This measure is taken as part of the structural transformation of the economy in the context of a special military operation. However, in the military industrial sector, unfortunately, we are still dominated by financiers. Does your company want an order to produce rockets and airplanes? Then take out loans secured by your property. This is a typical managerial approach, not the mobilization of the economy that is so necessary today.

I left the good thing for the conclusion. Submarines are made in St. Petersburg – designed by the Malakhit Design Bureau and manufactured by the Granit Concern. I know a little bit about the technological process, and I assure you that there is no American equipment at these plants. So we have the potential, given the will. And the Americans, I think, are smart people, which is why they still have an airplane and helicopter manufacturing company that was once founded by our former compatriot Igor Sikorsky.

**E. G. DRAPEKO:** – May I add? In St. Petersburg all defense enterprises operate with negative profits.

**S. A. TSYPLYAEV:** – The economy is not limited to the military sphere. It is necessary to create and develop civilian industries for a peaceful life, and here we face great difficulties.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – I agree. I'm ready to repeat my point: we're late again. A lot of things should have been done before, but now it's no longer possible. Now we are in a special situation, and we have to do another thing.

I invite Shamakhov Vladimir Alexandrovich to speak.

**V. A. SHAMAKHOV:** – I just have a few remarks. First, the new world order is multipolar and cannot be different. But it is noteworthy that both in the academia and in the household, people tend to ask questions: Who are we with? Where are we going? We are currently choosing with whom we will cooperate more and with whom less. In any case, in relations with the United States, China, India and other countries, we need a strategy, and there can be no strategy without ideology. Both the U.S. and China have an ideology that is very powerful, consistent and systematic.

Second, Russia often treats ideology as a faith or a dream. In fact, ideology is primarily goal-setting. If we don't decide that from the beginning, it will be hard to move forward, and we'll keep staggering back and forth. This is especially important now, when international law has all but collapsed. We have to decide that for ourselves.

Third, again about the poles. We speak of economic poles, political poles, etc. I suggest that we return to the traditional understanding of the pole as a physical phenomenon. The North Pole, or more precisely the Arctic, is a huge geostrategic resource. We don't believe this resource to be very important, but I suggest we look not only west, east and south, but also north. A global breakthrough, including an economic one, can be achieved through the Arctic.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Leonid Leonidovich Fituni, you have the floor.

**L. L. FITUNI:** – My colleague Shamakhov sees ideology as goal-setting. Let me remind you that ideology is commonly understood as a system of conceptualized ideas that express the interests, worldviews and ideals of a certain community – state, social class, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a few ideas that will meet this notion.

If we talk about a class worldview, it will be class ideas, if we want to formulate an ideology for the country, it must be something that would unite the country. An ideology that is acceptable to the entire world must include ideas that are perceived by the entire world as positive.

There is a rather beautiful concept of multipolarity, which was developed back in the 1990s by the remarkable Russian statesman E. M. Primakov. According to his prediction, the multipolar system will be based on three pillars – Russia, India, and China. But is this assumption correct? Will it really only be three countries? Or maybe more – plus, for example, the United States or some other state – Turkey, Iran? Are we ready for more poles of power? I don't think we would like that multipolarity very much. It would be worse for us than bipolarity or even unipolarity, because we would have to spend a lot of energy and resources to resist the pressure. So the future multipolar world requires careful study and scientifically sound, carefully

calibrated forecasts. In this sense, I am ready to support Maria Vladimirovna's thesis about China. She emphasized the foreign policy and partly the informational dimension of this issue. Once upon a time (not very long ago) China was indeed talked about in a mostly negative way. But I want to recall the attitude of the famous politician Anatoly Chubais, who, in the 1990s, responded to proposals for certain economic measures with the following objection: "Do you want us to be like China?" Back then, no one wanted to be "like China." By the end of the 1990s, a different point of view prevailed: China is growing so fast, but we have a different path. In the 2000s, the opinion changed again: why not be like China, if they have such impressive success?

As for Chinese history and mentality, there is one important detail to keep in mind. Those "quotes" that are often presented to us as Chinese wisdom sometimes come from nowhere. Much of what we allegedly know about China comes mostly from English-language sources. What exactly the Chinese say and what they mean by it – this information tends to come to us in an indirect form, since very few of us are able to read the original texts. Some of my closest relatives are Sinologists, so I trust their judgment in this matter.

So, in most cases, the Chinese do not have the concepts that we pass off as their vision. I had to deal with this from my own experience when a Chinese delegation came to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. The president of the academy said that we know the Chinese curse: may you live in an age of change. The Chinese interpreter couldn't translate it for a long time, asking what that would mean. A few minutes later it turned out that they didn't have such a saying.

We believe that we understand the Chinese (and not only Chinese) vision correctly. We say, China has always been an empire, it resisted any expansion, etc. However, for the last 300-plus years the Chinese, I mean the Han Chinese, have lived under the Manchu dynasty. The Han Chinese may have won wars millennia ago, but for centuries they have essentially been a colony of the Manchu state.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – It is as much a colony as we are a colony of Vikings.

**L. L. FITUNI:** – More like a colony of Tatars.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – No, Vikings.

**L. L. FITUNI:** – All right. And one last thing. The question of our foreign policy and multipolarity. In order to come out to the world with ideas, one has to be sure that these ideas are properly understood and will be supported. For us, the idea of the Russian world seems natural and obvious. But even for Africans, who for the most part support us, this idea is not entirely unambiguous. The Russian world is probably a good thing, but what good is it to us? Therefore, for interaction with these countries, I suggest another idea (as an option) – the idea of liberation. The concept may be as follows. In the 1990s, Russia, just like African countries at an earlier time, was essentially colonized – not as it happened 200 years ago, but with adjustments for the twenty-first century. A formally independent state, but in reality an oppressed and plundered periphery, from which the West drains resources, including brains. To some extent, we have repeated the experience of Germany

after World War I, when vast territories were taken away from it, and contributions, reparations, etc. were imposed. The main idea: you and us, we are ready to take the lead in a world that will be free from exploitation by the more developed countries. This message will be understood. I am not saying that we should forget about the Russian world, but, let me repeat, you can only look for allies and hope for support when you talk about common interests which are driven by common ideals.

Speaking of terms. The word "ideals" is closer to us, Russian people, than "values." European values are really values: something that can be mortgaged if you want to, something you can cash in on. A Russian and generally Orthodox person prefers ideals – something you fight for, that cannot be betrayed.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Thank you so much.

**L. L. FITUNI:** – Let us not forget why the USSR and China parted ways in the 1950s: it was the ideology. The Chinese said, don't give up on what you have achieved in 40 years of Soviet power and what we have learned from you. But we answered that we were going to start over. Now is the time to remember that lesson.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – I agree that was one reason, but not the only one. And the main one was that China was raising on its feet and was no longer willing to submit to the leadership from Moscow.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – Few people now remember the past rupture of relations between the USSR and China, but it actually happened. Today we resent our diplomats being expelled from various countries, but in China it was even worse: explosions at the embassy gates!

Why am I talking about this? In my opinion, all of this should be seen in the context of the country's policy in those years on a number of fronts. The refusal to engage with the Communist-oriented China was strategic. Indeed, those were primarily ideological differences – against the background of the fact that the long border between the countries did not disappear and the economic ties were quite strong. And all of a sudden, boom! – and something "snapped." Why? We talked all the time about how China doesn't want us to be strong. But no one in the world, not even the smallest country, wants anyone to get ahead of them.

Regarding the statement that the right of veto is a clear sign of inequality, I strongly disagree! We should not confuse inequality with the distribution of functional responsibilities. If someone is driving and you are a passenger, that does not mean there is inequality. You just have different functions at the moment. A small country cannot even physically afford to deal with the world agenda as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a fairly large staff, and solving global problems requires a tremendous amount of capacity. Therefore, the distribution of functions is, on the contrary, a sign of the balance of power, so that countries have the opportunity to implement equality.

It is nothing more than a myth that the Chinese have no friends. Yes, they call us "big noses," etc. China always perceived itself as the "Middle State" – Zhongguo – but

they did not demand tribute from anyone. They had vassal countries in their history, but here's the amazing thing – the Chinese lavished benefits on them! Delegations left them with gifts.

Unfortunately, it is now almost impossible to integrate into the Chinese information space, and we need our own correspondents, “eyes” on the ground, so to speak, in order to better understand what is happening there.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – We did not advocate equality. We wanted to address the fact that they wanted to humiliate us and deprive us of the status we believe we have. We naturally use the rhetoric of equality as propaganda because we don't like it and we want to gain allies. It seems to me that we should not be deceived about it.

As for the characteristics of different peoples, it is known, for example, that the Chinese, like the Turks, have no conscience. There is simply no such moral category. They have respect for their elders, which is why the pension system did not develop for a long time (why spend on it if young family members have to feed the aged?). The Japanese have no sense of humor – it is also a national trait.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – They have conscience in the form of the concept of losing face.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – This is not exactly what we mean when we talk about conscience in the Christian sense. Just different matrices.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – There are mostly Christians in the United States, but they have no conscience.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – The U.S. is not an Orthodox country. I am talking about Orthodox Christianity, not Protestantism which postulates that if you are rich, then you are close to God and should be looked up to. We have the opposite – if you are rich, you have to repent, because you probably stole somewhere or cheated someone.

I suggest that our colleague from Belarus speaks out.” Vitaly Nikolaevich Punchenko, please.

**V. N. PUNCHENKO:** – I will address a few points in the context of today's agenda.

First thesis. We are trying to formulate the meaning of our actions while essentially being in attack. But it seems that a more successful formula is first to create the semantic basis for action and next to perform the action itself. In our opinion, those on the other side of our civilization understood that first it is necessary to establish a point of unity (this is ardent Russophobia), and then they can proceed to action – sanctions, arms supplies, fake information. In the meantime, the Russian society, in our opinion, has not yet fundamentally changed its model of behavior. Indeed, the coherence and mobilization has not yet been achieved.

My thesis is as follows. The West mobilized on the basis of the prefix “anti,” that is, against a common enemy. This is certainly a strong base, but only in the short term. The ideologeme of creation is always long-term and requires considerable effort to gain adherents, otherwise it will not work. Thus, Ukraine, carried away in its time by Russophobia, lost the opportunity to become the center of Orthodoxy, the center of Eastern Slavicism. But it is very important for

us today not to remain in this point of “the West is the enemy, period.” This is not enough. The ideologeme we see today has not yet been articulated, but it is obvious that it is a restoration of historical justice for the sake of the eternal mission of preserving human civilization based on the Christian, namely Orthodox concept. Or we should urgently propose a new ideology which, as the experience of Belarus shows, is impossible. It is very dangerous to underestimate the internal processes that can change the trajectory of mass consciousness overnight: trust can be replaced by distrust, acceptance of difficulties by protests.

To elaborate on what Igor Ivanovich said, I will add: yes, Russia saved us politically, economically, psychologically, but in the ideological sense, everything depended on ourselves. In 2020, we carried out a special operation for self-denazification in Belarus, eradicating the symbols of the country's split and destruction from the mass consciousness forever.

Apart from the force, what is the recipe for overcoming the split in the society? We acted in the following way. 2021 was declared the year of national unity, thus sending a signal to the society that it is necessary to reconcile and unite around the authority. In the same year, National Unity Day was established on September 17. The society was engaged in an extensive dialogue about the new constitution, which was later adopted in a republican referendum. Now the task is to involve the society in new projects – consideration of the national security concept and building constructive, pro-state institutions of civil society, holding of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly.

Unfortunately, we don't pay sufficient attention to the topics that everyone understands, such as the value of peace. And yet such rhetoric could be a powerful incentive for the society to unite in support of the state. This is actually an image of the future which we will come to as a result of the purification.

I would like to remind you that the West issues ultimatums not only to Russia, but also to Belarus as its faithful ally. In this regard, the uncertainty expressed by many about the allied position of Belarus is very surprising. I am very grateful to Alexei Anatolyevich for the fact that our Union State was the first to be named among the multipliers of Russia's regional policy. Indeed, the Union State of Russia and Belarus should become a benchmark for scaling further projects, and we are ready for it. We look at Russia, we analyze. And for us Russia's vision of its future is very important – does it see itself as a civilization state or as a national country that is looking for someone to lean on.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Thank you very much. Dmitry Olegovich Babich, please.

**D. O. BABICH:** – I will begin with one, perhaps, funny remark. Colleagues cited a well-known saying that Russia has two allies – the army and the navy. But let us remember who ruined the Imperial Russia in February 1917. Revolutionary sailors of the Baltic Fleet! Even Chairman of the State Duma Mikhail Rodzyanko (we know what role he played in this revolution), who regularly received information about the sentiments of the Baltic sailors, said that it was better to sink this fleet than to have such an “ally.”

I think everyone would agree that you can't do without allies in modern international politics. And we need to



think about who our allies might be and why our adversaries are such. And here I will try to disagree with Sergey Alexeevich. We must proceed from the premise that it is not the people who are against us but the ideology. As soon as we say that the Anglo-Saxons or Poles are against us, we immediately lose, because it is impossible to defeat a nation. Unlike ideology.

Recall the last years of the Soviet Union and the rhetoric of the West during that period. “We are not against the Soviet people,” they said. “We adore the Russian people, the Ukrainian people, the Kazakh people. But you have a bad ideology.” And the Soviet people, tired of the queues and other inconveniences of late socialism, responded, “But we don’t like it either, let’s live without any ideology at all.” Now that we are talking about the need for a unified ideology, let me remind you of a meme: Mark Zuckerberg holds a portrait of Stalin in his hand and says, “Why is it that when the debate about this mustachioed man starts, our traffic skyrockets? If you know him, why doesn’t he work for us?” It’s a good indicator of the rifts that exist in our society. Stalin is indeed a statuesque figure, over whom Russian society still breaks down its spears.

I see at least three ideological arrays that have been shaped by Russian history itself, rather than implanted by someone’s malicious will. First of all, we have Soviet patriots – it is clear why, since 70 years of Soviet power could not pass without a trace. Secondly, patriots, let us say, of the country in general, some of whom resolutely reject the Soviet period. For example, true Orthodox believers who commemorate new martyrs every week, if not more often. Can they agree that the Soviet years were the best in Russian history? Of course not. Third, we have pro-European liberals. No matter how much we talk about cooperation with China and Africa, Russia remains a European country. For 70 years, our contacts with the rest of Europe and the Western world have been kept to a minimum. This enclosure has become a traumatic factor for many, which must somehow be mitigated. But, unfortunately, now such limitations have become unavoidable again, and here I agree with Konstantin Fedorovich.

What were the prerequisites of this situation? Let us address the recent history. Three post-Christian ideologies emerged in the early twentieth century: socialism, nationalism, and liberalism. Each of them had huge masses of adherents. All ideologies looked effective. Take socialism: it introduced public education, healthcare, polyclinics. People saw that it was not necessary to hire private teachers or call a private doctor; instead, services could be received in special institutions, and the quality of these services would be much higher.

But all three ideologies were simplified as they spread and degenerated into a bastardized version for billions of people. Nineteenth-century European nationalism was transformed into the monstrous Third Reich; a simplified version of the very sound socialist ideas of the late 19th century was embodied in the early Soviet Union, Maoist China, North Korea, etc. We are now living in a simplified, primitivized version of liberalism. I like your wording, Maria Vladimirovna – *totalitarian liberalism*. Some say “neoliberalism,” but I don’t think that term captures the essence of the phenomenon.

Here is a historic example. When works of art were being destroyed in revolutionary France in 1793, Abbé Henri

Grégoire who had been fighting against it coined the term “vandalism.” He explained why he chose this word for the actions he hated: the Vandals were the tribes of barbarians who sacked Rome.

Why do we need to find a word for the phenomenon that liberalism has become, why is it dangerous, and why is it impossible for us to reconcile with this ideology? First, because it has no “reverse” like other totalitarian ideologies. It is based on a total denial of history, which is associated with this very ideology. Just as Russian history had the uprisings of Yemelyan Pugachev and Stepan Razin, and then the Decembrists, the Narodniks, the Bolsheviks, so Americans had the struggle against racism in the 1960s, the feminist movement, the struggle for gay rights. And the rest of the history has to be crushed. We see monuments being demolished there, just as they did in Russia in 1918.

Second, there must be a formerly oppressed class in whose name the rights of other people can be restricted. By the time the Bolsheviks came to power, serfdom had been non-existent in Russia for 56 years, but from their speeches it seemed like it had disappeared literally the day before. They talked about protecting the proletariat, which accounted for no more than 8% of the population. We are witnessing the same thing now in the United States. Black people were equalized in rights with everyone else 50 years ago, but the fight against racism continues. If you look at what is going on in the arts, you will get the impression that these people were slaves just yesterday.

Third, global ambitions are characteristic of totalitarian socialism, totalitarian nationalism, and contemporary ultra-liberals. They claim world domination, presenting it as happiness for everyone.

By the way, the desire to make everyone happy is a great excuse for repression. What prevents us from achieving universal happiness? Rich peasants? Children of priests? Just get rid of them – no one will ever remember. Indeed, in the 1960s it seemed to be completely forgotten. But then they did remember, with known consequences.

We see the same thing today. The population of Donbass – who are they, anyway? A barrier on the journey to the development and happiness! Remove this population, and that’s it. That’s why we talk about Ukrainian Nazism and denazification. But let’s face it: the ideology that now dominates the United States and the European Union is certainly not Nazism. This is totalitarianism, but in a new, third form. And in the end, it is conflated with Nazism, because it is once again about world domination. Totalitarianism is always accompanied by enmity with large states. The Soviet Union was at odds with the United States, and before that with the British Empire, and now the West is going to fight Russia and China. But this state of affairs is a powerful basis for our alliance.

There can be no homogeneous environment in a large state. It is bound to have frightened neighbors, like China does today, or national minorities, like the Soviet Union did. So it turned out that in fighting the large countries, ultra-liberals are willing to support hard-core nationalists in these minorities or neighboring countries – current Ukrainian Nazis, Croatian fascists against Serbs, Uighurs against the Chinese. They use these radicals, but they don’t become radicals themselves. A good example is Poland, which is close to my heart. I know the Polish language, I’ve been keeping myself updated on this country for a long time, and I know

that the Kaczynski brothers have always been nationalists and haven't changed their ideology since the 1980s. But recently, about five years ago, sanctions had been imposed on them, all of a sudden. Why? Because it had seemed to the United States and the European Union that the line of struggle with Russia was no longer on the border of Poland, but moved to Donbass. That is, the Kaczynskis found themselves in the rear. And then they were reminded: your Catholicism is wrong, and there is something wrong with family values, and you prohibit abortions. However, the pressure on them is not so strong now, because they are on the border again.

The problem with this new, third kind of totalitarianism (let it be totalitarian liberalism, though it would be better to find a shorter term) is that this machine has no reverse. If the evolution of a true democratic society is difficult to predict, the trajectory of a totalitarian regime is always the same – only forward.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Thank you, Dmitry Olegovich. Dear colleagues, once again we are talking about what kind of an ideology we need and whether we need it at all. Apparently, it's such a vital topic that we inevitably return to it. I am very cautious about this problem, because I have witnessed futile attempts to create a new artificial ideology, just to set it against the old one. I am sure that the relevant article of the Constitution is long outdated, but that does not mean that another one should appear in its place – that we have or should have an ideology. In my opinion, ideology is a necessary attribute of political parties, movements and other communities that can gain support of the population during elections and then implement their ideas.

However, we need common benchmarks to develop some kind of an understanding. We have discussed that, too. For example, Mrs. Kharitonova outlined our priorities. Of course, Russia should be a self-sufficient country – the quality that we sometimes lacked at different stages of history. We worry all the time about the opinion of others, and very often it is detrimental to us. The entire history of perestroika was impregnated with that attitude: are we approved, are we applauded for our efforts to preserve peace and disintegrate the Soviet Union at the same time? Now we are beginning to get rid of it.

The memoirs of the hapless Field Marshal Count Burkhard von Münnich, who once said that Russia was a country ruled by God, because otherwise it is unclear how it could exist at all, have recently become popular. We have a lot of problems that need to be solved urgently. One such problem, and a major one, is that on February 24 this year we spurred a horse without fully resolving many of the smaller but important issues that should have been addressed in this case. And now we have to do it “on the march” – we have no other choice. It makes no sense now to discuss whether it was possible to do otherwise. In order not just to survive in this struggle, but to achieve the desired result, we have to do a lot. Let me remind you that Russia has never lost a domestic war. Other wars – yes, it did. It lost the Russo-Japanese War and the Crimean War, although the end of the latter might have been different, but Alexander II came to power and considered it a good thing to make peace. But domestic wars always ended in victory. The price for such victories is always very high, but people understand it, because such wars are about survival of the country, the state, each of us – those who are not ready to kneel.

I hope that we will quickly put the economy on a new track and mobilize all other resources. I am against internally searching for the enemies of the state. Even if there are such enemies, let us remember the sad experience of the twentieth century. It's better to leave them alone and stop worrying about it. And as to those who left, let them horse about there, as long as they don't disturb us here.

I thank all participants for the interesting and engaging discussion, and hope that we will continue to meet at the Likhachov Conference and other venues in the future.

**S. Yu. GLAZYEV:** – I thank all the participants of the section for the informative and interesting discussion.

**M. V. ZAKHAROVA:** – A couple of words about ideology. Last summer, Russia adopted a National Security Strategy. I think we can consider it our ideological guide. Morality, philosophy, economics, and everything else – every question has been answered.

**K. F. ZATULIN:** – Thank you very much.